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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
STATE TAXATION OF INDIANS-FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF TAXATION
AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY-McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); Tonasket v. Washing-
ton, 411 U.S. 451 (1973).
Over the years, the policy of the federal government toward Amer-
ican Indians has vacillated between attempts to assimilate them into
American society on the one hand and efforts to preserve their independ-
ence and cultural identity on the other. Like a pendulum, this policy,
as expressed in congressional legislation, has swung from efforts in
1887 to break up the reservations by transferring tribal lands to indi-
vidual Indians in fee,' to the halting in 1934 of further such aliena-
tion,2 and then back again since the 1950s to renewed efforts to end
tribal existence.3 The legal theories and canons of construction gener-
ated by a century and a half of judicial attempts to interpret and ac-
commodate these inconsistent and conflicting federal policies collide
on the question of a state's jurisdiction to tax Indians.
The conflict is reflected in three opinions delivered by the United
States Supreme Court last term. In McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Commission,4 Arizona attempted to apply its personal income tax
to a full-blooded member of the Navajo tribe whose entire income was
derived from activities on the reservation where she lived and worked.
The Court held that the federal government had preempted this
I. General Allotment Act of February 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered
sections of 9, 25 U.S.C. (1970)).
2. Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984 (codified in scattered
sections of Protection of Indians and Conservation of resources, 14, 25 U.S.C. (1970)).
3. Pertinent legislation includes the followinfg: Klamath Indians, 25 U.S.C. § 564
(1970); Mixed Blood Ute Indians, 25 U.S.C. § 677 (1970); Western Oregon Indians, 25
U.S.C. § 691; Alabama and Coushatta Indians, 25 U.S.C. § 721 (1970); Piute Indians,
25 U.S.C. § 741 (1970); Menominee Indians, 25 U.S.C. § 891 (1970); Wyanadotte and
Ottawa Indians, 25 U.S.C. § 891 (1970); Ponca Indians, 25 U.S.C. § 971 (1970); Peoria
Indians, 25 U.S.C. § 821 (1970) (enactments all within the period 1954 to 1962, dis-
solving the named groups). Indian Civil Rights Act of April 11, 1968, 25 U.S.C. §
1301-41 (1970) (imposes restrictions on tribal government similar to those contained in
the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution). Act of August 15, 1953, 28 U.S.C. §
1360 (1970) (permitted a number of states to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over
tribes within their borders).
4. 411 U.S. 164(1973).
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sphere of taxation and struck down application of the personal in-
come tax; furthermore, since the state had failed to comply with rele-
vant federal statutes, it lacked jurisdiction over the Indians it sought
to tax. In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,5 the tribe constructed and
operated ski resort facilities on off-reservation property leased by a
tribal corporation from the United States Forest Service. 6 New
Mexico attempted to apply a gross receipts tax to the facilities and a
use tax to materials purchased out of state for construction of the ski
lifts. The Court upheld the gross receipts tax because of the
off-reservation situs of the resort; it struck down application of the use
tax to materials used to construct permanent improvements on the
land, however, as inconsistent with the tribe's statutory exemption
from land taxation. Finally, in Tonasket v. Washington,7 the Court
considered Washington's attempt to impose an excise tax upon ciga-
rettes sold by an Indian on a reservation over which the state had pre-
viously assumed civil and criminal jurisdiction. Tonasket, a
full-blooded member of the Colville tribe, conducted a retail trade on
his alloted lands on the Colville Indian reservation, purchasing brand
name cigarettes from out of state distributors and selling them tax-free
to non-Indians. The Colville tribe had consented to the state's assump-
tion of jurisdiction over the reservation in 19578 pursuant to Public
Law 83-280. 9 In a per curiam opinion, the Court vacated the Wash-
ington Supreme Court decision upholding the state tax dnd remanded
for reconsideration in light of McClanahan.10
These cases provide an opportunity for reassessing the extent of a
state's power to tax Indians. The Court has jettisoned prior Constitu-
tional theories and charted a new course which this note will analyze:
federal preemption of Indian affairs as viewed against an historical
backdrop of Indian sovereignty. An important element of the Court's
new approach is its emphasis on evaluating Congress's intent in
5. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
6. Development of facilities was made possible by loans from the United States
under the authority of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1970). The facil-
ities were built and operated by the corporation subject to federal approval of plans for
initial facilities, construction of improvements and arrangements for subleasing, bud-
geting and accounting. See note 29 infra.
7. 411 U.S. 451 (1973), vacating per curia/n, 79 Wn. 2d 607, 488 P.2d 281 (1971).
8. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 37.12 (1963).
9. Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970) (criminal portion)
and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970) (civil portion) [hereinafter cited as P.L. 83-280].
10. See note 7 sutpra.
192
Vol. 49: 191, 1973
State Taxation of Indians
drafting the federal legislation pertinent to the facts of each case,
rather than on applying abstract judicial doctrines. The Court re-
served judgment in McClanahan on whether Congress in providing
for state assumption of criminal and civil jurisdiction over reserva-
tions in P.L. 83-280 intended to allow the states to tax Indians. The
remand of Tonasket is explicable as an invitation to the Washington
court to reach a decision on the key issue of the scope and purpose of
P.L. 83-280. This note appraises various categories of state taxes as
applied to Indians in light of the Court's new approach; included in
this discussion will be an examination of considerations relevant to the
Washington court's interpretation of P.L. 83-280 on the Tonasket
remand.
I. THE COURT'S NEW THEORY
Prior inconsistent interpretations of Indian policy required the Su-
preme Court to confront and reconcile competing theories of Indian
Law. In McClanahan and Mescalero, the Court charted a new consti-
tutional approach in which it relied on the doctrine of federal preemp-
tion,"1 it preserved but limited the test which focuses on protection of
Indian self-government from state encroachment, 12 rejected the theory
that Indian individuals or tribes are federal instrumentalities'3 and
ignored the concepts of Indian wardship 14 and benefit-burden bal-
ancing.1 5 The Court summarized its theory in McClanahan:'6
II. The authority for dealing with Indian tribes is vested in the federal government
by the treaty clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. The power to regulate commerce with
the Indian tribes is also vested in the federal government, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. Cf.
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956).
... [T] he federal statutes "touch a field in which the federal interest is so domi-
nant that the federal system [must] be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject.'
12. See text accompanying notes 38-40 infra.
13. See text accompanying note 35 infra.
14. The idea that Indians are "wards" subject to the "guardianship" of the federal
government hails from the days when the United States made treaties promising protec-
tion to conquered and subdued nations. It antedates the United States citizenship of
Indians and the promotion of tribal self-government and economic self-sufficiency. To
argue that the guardian-ward relationship places any Indian function, whatever it may
be, under the protection of the federal government is equitably appealing since most
tribes feel that they paid taxes for all time when they gave up some two billion acres of
land to the United States, but it ignores the complex body of Indian law which has strug-
gled with the status of a "domestic dependent nation" for years and the imminent prob-
lems arising from the externalities of reservation development. It is a concept too vague
to be determinative of the tax litigation before the Court this term.
15. A frequently urged theory in the cases concerning Indian taxation is the ben-
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. . . IT] he State has interfered with matters which the relevant
treaty and statutes leave to the exclusive province of the Federal Gov-
ernment and the Indians themselves.
While endorsing the continued importance of the concept of Indian
sovereignty, the Court added a caveat:
17
The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it
provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it
provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal
statutes must be read.
When Congress occupies a field, determining the scope of its
preemption is primarily a matter of ascertaining its intention;' 8 the
Court, therefore, in reaching its decisions, focused on congressional
intent as expressed in the particular statutes and treaties involved in
the cases. In McClanahan, the Court read the Navajo Treaty,1 9 the
efit-burden theory found in Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission. 380
U.S. 685 (1965). The specific language is:
And since federal legislation has left the state with no duties or responsibilities re-
specting the reservation Indians, we cannot believe that Congress intended to leave
to the state the privilege of levying this tax.
Id. at 691. It would be a denial of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment
of the United States Constitution for a state to deny reservation Indians benefits which
it extended to other citizens of the state, Acosta v. San Diego County. 126 Cal. App. 2d
455, 272 P.2d 92 (1954). Furthermore, due process requires that the state power to
tax a foreign entity bear some relation to the protection, services and benefits conferred
by the state on the taxed entity, Wisconsin v. T. C. Penny Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
Principles of tax administration supported in use tax collection cases, see, e.g., Scripto.
Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960), allow the state to put the burden of collecting
excise taxes on absentee vendors. The states justify taxation of Indians by showing the
commingling of other residents with the Indians and a level of services as high as that
provided non-Indians. The tribes argue in reply that state services are minimal and
that the federal government meets the bulk of the costs of expenditures on the reservation.
16. 411 U.S. at 165.
17. 411 U.S. at 172.
The doctrine of Indian sovereignty derives from the fact that as the first Americans.
Indian tribes enjoyed the aboriginal status of completely sovereign nations. Having re-
linquished their sovereignty to the federal government only to the extent provided by
treaty, their powers remain inherent rather than delegated. The scope of relinquishment
of these powers can be expanded only by subsequent act of Congress or by the Indians'
consensual abandonment of such rights. The rule, based on the theory that the laws of
one sovereign are not applicable to the subjects of another sovereign, was that general
federal statutes did not apply to Indians unless specific reference was made to them. Elk
v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). This rule has been eroded by subsequent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, see, e.g., Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691 (193 1) and by
the silent acquiescence of Congress.
18. Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515.
554.
19. 15 Stat. 667 (1868). The primary subject matter of treaties between the Indian
nations and the United States is the control of land formerly held by the Indian tribes.
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Arizona Enabling Act,20 the Buck Act2' and several other federal stat-
utes as indicating, when considered together with traditional views of
Indian sovereignty, that Congress did not intend to allow the states to
tax Indians on their reservations. Though no immunity from state
taxation is explicitly reserved in the Navajo Treaty, the Court rea-
soned that the circumstances under which the agreement was reached
indicated that the treaty was meant to establish the reservation as
within the exclusive sovereignty of the Navajos under general federal
supervision. The provision of the Arizona Enabling Act expressly disa-
vowing an intention to preclude state taxation of Indian property off
the reservation was cited as evidence that state tax immunity was in-
tended within the reservation. The court read the Buck Act, which
provides comprehensive federal guidance for state taxation of persons
living in federally controlled areas, but explicitly exempts "Indians not
otherwise taxed," as refuting the notion that the states had residual
power to impose taxes on reservation Indians. The Court concluded
that statutes authorizing states to assert tax jurisdiction over reserva-
tions in special situations are explicable only if Congress assumed that
states lack inherent power to impose taxes without such authoriza-
tion.22 Finally, P.L. 83-280, authorizing states to assume civil and
All treaty referenceg to taxation of Indians pertain exclusively to the state and federal
tax immunity of certain real and personal property. Silence on 'ther kinds of taxes al-
lows at least two arguments: First, that they may be levied against Indians, or second,
that the power to tax is never found to exist by implication, other kinds of taxation pre-
sumed sub silentio to be within the exclusive province of the Indian tribes as aboriginal
sovereigns. One's view as to the appropriate inference ultimately depends on his or her
view of the historical relationship between the Indian and the federal government, as
well as upon what is the desirable relationship between them today. See Williams V.
Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (Justice Black's discussion of the modification of Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)). Most of the treaties acknowledge the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States, but a later case holds that similar language in a state-
hood act is not invariably exclusive of state authority, Organized Village of Kake v.
Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1965).
20. 36 Stat. 557 (1910). State enabling acts generally provide that the people of a
state forever disclaim all right and title to reservation lands but they do not preclude
state taxation of lands owned or held by Indians outside the reservation or from which
restrictions on alienation have been removed unless Congress specifically prescribes an
exemption. The reasons. for allowing the state to tax non-reservation land were (1) to
put all owners similarly situated on an equal footing, and (2) to put the new state on an
equal footing with the original states with respect to jurisdiction to tax, Ward v. Race
Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
21. 4 U.S.C. §§ 104 etseq. (1970).
22. Numerous acts of Congress prohibit state taxation with respect to Indian reser-
vations and nearly as many statutes authorize such taxation. Sections prohibiting state
taxation are 25 U.S.C. §§ 86, 233, 355, 409a, 416i, 465, 487c, 492, 501, 564c (1970).




criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians, was cited by the Court
as additional evidence that Congress did not recognize an inherent
state jurisdiction to tax Indians. In the words of the Court,23
But we cannot believe that Congress would have required the consent
of the Indians affected and the amendment of those state constitutions
which prohibit the assumption of jurisdiction if the States were free to
accomplish the same goal unilaterally by simple legislative enact-
ment.
Furthermore, the Court implied that even if there were no federal
preemption by Congress, the states would not be able to enforce taxes
on the reservation without first complying with P.L. 83-280 because
state courts would have no civil or criminal jurisdiction. 24
In Mescalero, however, the Court declined to extend the doctrine
of federal preemption to Indian activities off the reservation, again
gauging Congress's intention from a reading of relevant statutes and
treaties. 25 The Court observed that the New Mexico Enabling Act,26
similar to Arizona's, indicated no congressional intent to preclude state
taxation of off-reservation Indian property. In addition, citing prec-
edents applying state criminal laws 27 and fishing regulations28 to In-
dians beyond the reservation boundaries, the Court noted that
non-discriminatory state law had been applied to Indians off the reser-
vation. The Court further held that the explicit exemption from prop-
erty taxes granted by the Indian Reorganization Act 29 extended only
to permanent improvements on land and not to income taxes.
23. 411 U.S. at 178.
24. See note 108 infra for a discussion of cases concerning methods of assuming ju-
risdiction under P.L. 83-280.
25. 411 U.S. at 148-49.
Absent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation
boundaries have generally been held subject to non-discriminatory state law other-
wise applicable to all citizens of the State.
26. 36Stat. 557 (1910).
27. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896) (Indians cannot exercise treaty right
to hunt off the reservation in violation of state laws).
28. Puyallup v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (the state may, in the
interest of conservation, regulate fishing by Indians in common with the fishing of others
if reasonable and necessary).
29. Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1970), provides
that lands and rights in land acquired pursuant to the Act for the tribes are free from
state and local taxation. It should be noted that the Indian Reorganization Act is the
foundation of present-day tribal organizations. It prohibited further allotment. See text
accompanying note I supra. Substantial land was restored to tribal ownership, and new
land replaced some of the tribal lands lost to non-Indians during the allotment period.
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United States v. Mason,30 decided subsequent to McClanahan and
Mescalero, indicates how the Court's new theory of federal preemp-
tion, understood against a backdrop of Indian sovereignty, may be
applied in the future. The representatives of the estate of the decedent,
a restricted Osage Indian,31 argued that McClanahan had substan-
tially extended the protection afforded Indian tribes against state taxa-
tion and had therefore undermined West v. Oklahoma Tax Commis-
sion.32 West had upheld Oklahoma's inheritance tax as applied to re-
stricted Osage Indians. Without deciding whether it would continue to
adhere to West in a case squarely presenting the tax issue,33 the Court
noted that the McClanahan situation was wholly different from that
presented in Mason because the Osage Indians had become assimi-
lated into the general community. 34 The Court carefully distinguished
the other cases which the lower court had cited as undermining the
West rationale on the grounds that they involved a different tax, a dif-
ferent level of government or a tribe organized pursuant to a different
statute. The Court's discussion in Mason reaffirms suggestions in
Funds were appropriated for the organization and operation of Indian corporations.
Tribal proprietary enterprises were required to be conducted "not inconsistent with the
law." Tribes were encouraged and authorized to adopt constitutions which were subject
to ratification by tribal members and approval by. the Secretary of the Interior. All of
the constitutions so adopted were, in fact, prepared by the Department of the Interior,
see Hearings on Const. Rights ofthe American Indian, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I at 165
(1962). The dual goals of the Act of developing tribal self-government and economic
independence so as to permit Indians "to enter the white world on a footing of equal
competition," 78 Cong. Rec. 11732 (daily ed., June 15, 1934), are the source of the
major controversy over the Act in the context of state tax litigation. Basically, the
argument is over how far Congress' protective policy toward Indians goes.
30. 93 S.Ct. 2202 (1973).
31. I.e., a member of the Osage tribe not authorized to alienate his real property.
His land is held in trust for him and he receives only the income. This disability can be
removed only by a certificate of competency granted at the discretion of the Secretary of
the Interior. 34 Stat. 544 (1906), amended until 1984 by 52 Stat. 1035 (1938).
32. 334 U.S. 717 (1948).
33. The plaintiff's principal argument in Mason was that the United States had
breached its fiduciary duty as a trustee of Indian property in failing to anticipate that
McClanahan and lower court decisions had so weakened the rationale of West that it
would be overruled.
34. 93 S. Ct. at 2206 n.7. The Osage reservation originally belonged to the Chero-
kee Nation who agreed in a treaty with the United States, 14 Stat. 799 (1866), to let the
Osages settle in their territory. In 1883, the Cherokees conveyed the area to the United
States to be held in trust for the Osages. Subsequently, the Osage Allotment Act, 34
Stat. 539 (1906), divided tribal land equally among members of the tribe subject to
restrictions on alienation and created trusts for individual shares in income derived
from minerals located on the land. See text accompanying notes 66 to 70 infra for a
further discussion of Mason.
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McClanahan and Mescalero that those cases should not be read as
asserting as an inflexible doctrine, constitutional 35 or otherwise in ori-
gin, that the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over In-
dians on reservations to the exclusion of all state taxing power, 36 the
Court made quite clear that the scope of federal preemption will be
ascertained from the particular facts and legislation involved in each
case. Moreover, the backdrop of sovereignty concept weights the scale
against taxation only on those reservations which have successfully
resisted assimilation and retained substantial tribal self-government. 37
Federal preemption thus applies, with varying effects, to state ef-
forts to tax Indians on or off their reservations. But state taxation of
non-Indians may also affect Indian activities when state enforcement
extends onto the reservation. In dealing with taxation of non-Indians
engaged in reservation activities, the McClanahan Court, in the ab-
sence of controlling federal statutes, decided to rely on the older rule of
Williams v. Lee:38 Application of state law would not be permitted if
it would interfere with the right of Indians to make their own laws and
be ruled by them. The McClanahan Court limited this rule, formerly
35. Mescalero clearly rejected the theory underlying some older Indian tax cases
that Indian lands were immune from state taxation as a matter of constitutional law.
The doctrine of implied govenmental immunity has not been a concept limited to In-
dian law. Under it, a tax which interferes with a "'federal instrumentality" is void. Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942) (an army post exchange is a federal instru-
mentality). In United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903), the Court had occasion to
consider the applicability of the instrumentality doctrine to Indian affairs and held that
lands, some improvements and farm implements issued to the Indians by the United
States were instrumentalities. Since then, the doctrine has been greatly narrowed and.
after Mescalero, is inapplicable to Indian tribes or individuals.
36. Acceptance of such an assertion would be tantamount to acceptance of the fed-
eral instrumentality doctrine which was rejected in Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 150-55.
37. 93 S. Ct. at 2206 n.7 (The Tlinget Indians involved in Organized Village of
Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962), were never given a reservation, nor made treaties
with the United States, but had organized their villages into corporations chartered
under the Indian Reorganization Act, see note 29 supra.) (For a discussion of the Osage
Indians see discussion at note 34 and accompanying text supra.).
The Court's decision in McClanahan preserved the holdings of Kake and Oklahoma
Tax Commission by distinguishing them on the ground that the Indians involved lacked
the essential features of tribal self-government. The interpretation of the particular legis-
lation governing these tribes was the key factor in determining whether the state might
tax their activities. For instance, the Court in Kake held that " 'absolute' federal juris-
diction was not invariably exclusive jurisdiction" and that this language in the Alaska
Statehood Act, 72 Stat. 339 (1959), did not preclude the exercise of residual state au-
thority over use of fish traps by Indians. The ultimate decision in Tonasket similarly will
depend on whether state assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction over the reserva-
tion pursuant to P.L. 83-280 includes the power to tax. Future efforts by states to tax on
reservations will be based on (1) the exclusion of reservations lacking traditional tribal
self-government from the preemption approach or (2) the Williams rule that a state re-
tains jurisdiction over non-I ndians on reservations.
38. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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applied to all regulation of reservation activities, to transactions in-
volving only non-Indians. 39
The relevance of this distinction between Indian and non-Indian
activities on the reservation to a state's power of taxation was empha-
sized by the Court's dismissal last Term of Kahn v. Arizona State Tax
Commission0 for want of a substantial federal question. The issue in
Kahn was whether a state could tax a non-Indian attorney's income
earned on the reservation from employment by the Navajo Tribe. The
Court's refusal to review the Arizona Court of Appeals decision that
the lawyer's income could be taxed indicates that the state retains ju-
risdiction over non-Indian activity on Indian reservations.
In summary, after McClanahan and Mescalero, because of consid-
erations of Indian sovereignty, the fundamental factor to be consi-
dered is the situs of the taxation. Where the state seeks to tax the fruits
of Indian activity on the reservation, three consequences follow. First,
the conflict between two traditional canons of construction (exemp-
tions to tax laws should never be implied,41 and doubtful expressions
in Indian treaties are to be construed in favor of the Indians and
against state taxation42) is to be resolved in favor of the latter. Second,
the distinction between state taxes on land and income is irrelevant.
Third, it is also irrelevant whether the state tax infringes on the indi-
vidual or the tribe.43 In contrast to Indians on the reservation, Indians
going beyond the reservation are subject to nondiscriminatory state
laws that otherwise apply to all persons in the state,44 as well as to the
canon of construction that exemptions to tax laws should never be
implied.45
39. But even if the state's premise [that state taxation of reservation members can
be reconciled with tribal self-determination] we reject the suggestion that the
Williams test was meant to apply in this situation. It must be remembered that
cases applying the Williams test have dealt principally with situations involving
non-Indians [citation omitted]. In these situations, both the Tribe and the State
could fairly claim an interest in asserting their respective jurisdictions. The Wil-
liams test was designed to resolve this conflict.
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 179.
40. 411 U.S. 941 (1973).
41. Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691 (1931).
42. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665"(1912).
43. This distinction is relevant under the rejected federal instrumentality doctrine,
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 170 n.5.
44. See notes 27 & 28 supra.
45. 411U.S. at 156.
But absent clear statutory guidance, courts ordinarily will not imply tax exemp-
_tions and will not exempt off-reservation income from tax simply because the land
from which it is derived, or its other source, is itself exempt from tax.
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II. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S NEW THEORY
ON PRIOR TAX DECISIONS
In the cases decided by the Court this term, the taxes at issue were
general excise taxes imposed on receipts derived from employment,
business or the use of property. Although no prior tax decision con-
cerning Indians was specifically overruled, past decisions which rely
on theories now rejected by the Court must be confined to their facts.
This section will be devoted to an analysis of the ability of states to
impose specific kinds of taxes in light of the McClanahan-Mescalero
approach.
A. Income Tax
McClanahan and Mescalero held that state income taxes may not
be imposed on the income of Indians living and working on the reser-
vation, as long as the tribe has not submitted to state jurisdiction. 46
Application of the federal income tax to Indians has been generally
upheld absent a clear statutory intent to exempt the income in ques-
tion. 47 The Court's new theory vitiates its often relied on analogy be-
tween state and federal income taxation. As an example of this anal-
ogy, the Court in Leahy v. Oklahoma48 upheld a state tax on an Indi-
an's share of income from the tribe's restricted mineral resources,
citing as authority Choteau v. Burnet,49 a decision which held under
similar facts that an Indian's income was subject to the federal income
tax. Leahy appears to have been simply confined to its facts since
Mescalero cited it for its holding without further comment. 50
46. For a discussion of a state's power to tax on reservations over which civil and
criminal jurisdiction has been assumed see text accompanying notes 84-100 infra.
47. Compare Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S.
418 (1935) (Indian income from tax-exempt sources was subject to federal income taxa-
tion when reinvested on grounds no specific exemption existed and none could be im-
plied from the wardship status of the Indian) with Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1
(1956) (immunity from federal capital gains taxation upon sale of timber from allocated
land premised on provision of General Allotment Act which said the fee was to be trans-
ferred free of all charge or encumbrance).
48. 297 U.S. 420 (1936).
49. 283 U.S. 691 (1931). Though it was not clear in Choteau whether the income
was derived from oil lands comprising the reservation or purchased off the reservation.
the Court rested its decision on the proposition that tax exemptions are never implied
and a distinction between exempt land and its fruits. With respect to on reservation ac-
tivity, McClanahan rejected both these principles, but Choteau's continuing validity as
Leahy's predecessor cannot be determined without knowing the status of the land in-
volved therein.
50. 411 U.S. at 157.
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Thus, the Court's approach to federal taxation on the reservation is
now fundamentally different from that of state taxation, and no an-
alogy between them is justified. Application of a state income tax to
reservation Indians is presumed invalid unless tribal sovereignty has
ceased through historical accident or design or express congressional
permission to overcome the presumption of sovereignty. Federal taxa-
tion, on the other hand, is presumed valid unless a clear congressional
intent to exempt the income appears.
B. Estate Tax
West v. Oklahoma Tax Commission51 and its precursor, Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. United States5 2 are the principal decisions up-
holding state taxation of Indian estates. In the latter case, the Court
held that the statutory immunity of Indian lands from state taxation
extended to estate taxation on the transfer of those lands, but that this
estate tax exemption did not include within its coverage the transfer of
restricted cash and securities, lands not specifically exempt from direct
taxation and miscellaneous personal property and insurance not
tax-exempt at the time of death. This decision was based on the prin-
ciple that tax exemptions must derive from the plainly expressed in-
tention of Congress,53 although the Court also mentioned the Osages'
assimilation into the general community and the principle of benefit-
burden sharing. The McClanahan decision, by invoking the federal
preemption doctrine, in effect rejected this principle as applied to In-
dian reservations, holding that state taxation on reservations is not
permissible absent express Congressional consent. The McClanahan
decision preserved the result in Oklahoma Tax Commission, however,
by distinguishing the Osage Indians as a tribe without the usual attrib-
utes of sovereignty, their assimilated status removing Indian sover-
eignty as a reason for tax immunity.
West extended the Oklahoma Tax Commission ruling to permit
state taxation of mineral headrights transferred at death, 54 as well as
various forms of income and assets derived ultimately from these
51. 334 U.S. 717 (1948). See text accompanying note 33 supra.
52. 319 U.S. 598 (1943).
53. The Court relied on United States Trust Co. of New York v. Helvering, 307
U.S. 57 (1939).
54. A "headright" is the interest of the individual member of the tribe in the tribal
trust estate. West, 334 U.S. at 719 n.2.
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headrights and held in trust for the Osage Indians by the federal gov-
ernment. The Court based its decision on the theory that an inherit-
ance tax is not levied against the restricted 55 property itself, to which
the United States had legal title, but upon the shifting economic bene-
fits and the privilege of transmitting or receiving such benefit. The
West decision seems to have been weakened by McClanahan to the
extent that it relied on the distinction between taxes on incorporeal
property and on the right to receive income derived from it, a distinc-
tion similar to the land-income dichotomy rejected in McClanahan.
United States v. Mason makes it fairly clear, however, that West
can be distinguished and preserved. Though not squarely reaffirming
West, the Court made at least three arguments in favor of its con-
tinuing validity. First, the Court noted in Mason that decisions con-
cerning other types of taxes are not applicable to estate taxation where
the tax is imposed on the transfer of property, not the property itself.
This rationale avoids reliance on a formalistic distinction between
federal ownership of title and individual use of income, but is of ques-
tionable value since other taxes imposed on abstract concepts have
been stricken down. 56 Second, the Court noted that the Osage Allot-
ment Act 57 did not provide for the removal of tax restrictions on the
property upon its transfer out of Indian ownership. Such a provision
had been heavily relied on to invalidate application of a federal cap-
ital gains tax to profits from the sale of timber on trust land in Squire
v. Capoeman.5 8 The Mason Court's reliance on the intent of Congress
as inferred from the particular applicable statutes is consistent with
the Mescalero and McClanahan approaches. 59 Finally, the Court
noted that McClanahan had distinguished the special assimilated
status of the Osage Tribe which removes Indian sovereignty as a
reason for tax immunity.60
In the future, when a state attempts to impose an estate tax on un-
55. See note 31 supra.
56. See, e.g., Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (195 1). invalidating
of a state franchise tax on the privilege of doing business in the state, since the incidence
of the tax fell entirely on interstate commerce. "It is not a matter of labels. The inci-
dence of the tax provides the answer." Id. at 608.
57. 34Stat. 539 (1906).
58. 351 U.S. 1 (1956). See text accompanying note 47 supra.
59. See also Kirkwood v. Arenas, 243 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1957) (Mission Indian Act
and General Allotment Act read and applied in pari nateria to exempt Indians from
California inheritance tax).
60. 93 S. Ct. at 2206 n.7.
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assimilated Indians, the Court will doubtless consider the source of
the items in the deceased Indian's estate as an important factor in
determining the tax's validity. Since the holdings and rationales of
Oklahoma Tax Commission and West appear to be limited to assimi-
lated Indians such as the Osage tribe, the Court will apparently apply
the same reasoning it developed in McClanahan to estate tax cases of
unassimilated Indians, determining the intent of Congress as expressed
by the relevant statutes in each case. It is difficult to believe that Con-
gress intended to take different approaches for taxes on income and
on "shifting of economic benefits" when both are based on reservation
activities. Therefore, in arriving at the tax base in either situation, the
McClanahan distinction between items generated from activity on the
reservation and items generated from activity off the reservation may
be logically applied and only the latter taxed.
C. Sales and Use Taxes
There is a paucity of prior authority concerning the imposition of
state sales and use taxes on transactions occurring on Indian reserva-
tions,61 but the validity of such taxes is likely to be litigated in the
near future as Indian economic development thrusts Indian business
into increasing competition with non-Indian enterprises. For example,
the Yakima Nation, a Washington tribe which has ceded no jurisdic-
tion to the state, is contesting the validity of the seizure of cigarettes
destined for sale on the reservation, primarily to non-Indians, free of
the state's cigarette excise tax.62
Generally, when a sale and delivery take place within the taxing
state, the jurisdictional basis for a sales tax exists.6 3 When a sale takes
place in another state, but the property purchased is used within the
taxing state, the jurisdictional basis for a use tax on the purchaser ex-
ists. 64 The out-of-state seller is not required to collect the tax, how-
ever, unless delivery to the buyer is effected within the taxing state65
61. For a discussion of the use tax applied to Indians off the reservation in a
jurisdiction with nondiscriminatory tax laws, see text accompanying notes 72-75 infra.
62. Yakima Indian Nations v. Dept. of Revenue, Doc. No. 72-13, Wn. Bd. Tax
App. (filed Aug. 31, 1972).
63. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
64. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., Inc., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
65. . . . [A] t the time of the sale [to a Maryland purchaser in Delaware], no one
is liable for a Maryland use tax. That liability arises only upon importation of the
203
Washington Law Review
and the seller also has sufficient minimum contacts with the taxing
state to satisfy due process requirements. 66 Whether these jurisdic-
tional tax rules applying between states can be analogized to transac-
tions occurring on Indian reservations within a state is an open ques-
tion. A state may or may not have a legitimate interest in taxing cer-
tain transactions on the reservation in order to prevent non-Indian cit-
izens from evading state taxes by purchasing items tax-free on the res-
ervation for use back in the taxing forum.
A compensating use tax, imposed on the non-Indian buyer for the
privilege of using property within the state but purchased on the reser-
vation, is a device by which a state could compensate for the lost sales
tax on such transactions. However, since it is impractical to collect a
compensating use tax from each individual non-Indian as he returns
from the reservation, the real question becomes whether the state may
impose the duty of collecting it on the Indian seller. By qualified
analogy to cases involving similar tax situations between states, the
answer depends on whether the seller has sufficient contacts with the
taxing forum to satisfy the requirements of due process. In Scripto,
Inc. v. Carson,67 the Court held that Florida could constitutionally
require a Georgia corporation to collect a use tax on pens manufac-
tured in Georgia but delivered in Florida for use by Florida residents.
The Court distinguished Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland,68 in which a
similar tax had been stricken down, on the ground that the residents
of the taxing state in that case had gone personally to the store in an
adjoining state to buy the goods. 69 The importance of this distinction
is not clear in the case of non-Indians, since the state retains jurisdic-
tion over them while on the reservation.
After McClanahan, Indian activity on the reservation is tax-exempt
so it is unlikely that a state sales tax on Indian businesses will be up-
held. The basis for a use tax on non-Indian purchasers seems clearly
merchandise to the taxing state, an event which occurs after the sale is complete
and one as to which the vendor may have no control or even knowledge, at least as
to merchandise carried away by the buyer. The consequence is that liability against
the Delaware vendor is predicated upon use of the goods in another state and by
another person.
Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954). Accord, Scripto v. Carson. 362
U.S. 207, 212 (1960).
66. Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
67. Id.
68. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
69. See note 65 supra.
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to exist, however, since there is no real distinction between property
purchased out of state or property purchased on the reservation and
used in the taxing forum by its residents. Because the state retains
taxing jurisdiction over non-Indians even while they are on the reser-
vation,70 state highways may be used in the importation of goods for
resale on reservations,71 and the goods are almost certain to be used
off the reservation in the taxing state, it can be argued that sufficient
minimum contacts exist between the Indian seller and the state to re-
quire the Indian seller to collect the use tax from non-Indian pur-
chasers.
D. Personal Property Tax
The personal property tax cases concerning Indians can easily be
summarized since they all rely on at least one of the two grounds
forming the basis of the decision in United States v. Rickert.72 In that
case, permanent improvements and cattle, horses and farming equip-
ment issued by the United States to Indians were held not subject to
local personal property taxes because (1) the permanent improve-
ments had become part of the realty which was an instrumentality of
the federal government, and (2) taxation would frustrate the federal
purpose of emancipating the Indians. The decision had the effect of
broadening the federal instrumentality doctrine to include those ob-
jects which the Court found necessary for the implementation of fed-
eral policy. The Mescalero opinion reaffirms the first rationale of the
Rickert decision, insofar as that rationale barred a use tax on Indian
personal property which had become permanently attached to
tax-exempt realty.73
Two Washington cases illustrate how the second Rickert rationale
is commonly applied. In Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam County,7 4
personal property used in a hotel and restaurant business under Indian
70. Kahn v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 941 (1973), discussed in text
accompanying note 40 supra.
71. Cf. Smith v. State, 64 Wn. 2d 323, 391 P.2d 718 (1964). The court held that the
interruption of the movement of logs in Washington for the convenience of the
out-of-state company is an incident sufficient to support a state business and occupation
tax.
72 188 U.S. 432 (1903).
73. Rickert's reliance on the federal instrumentality doctrine has since been aban-
doned.
74. 73 Wn. 2d 677, 440 P.2d 442 (1968).
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management and ownership on the reservation was held not subject to
a county personal property tax on the ground that imposition of the
tax would interfere with a "discernable federal policy" to encourage
Indians to acquire property as "the fruits of their own work, labor,
and enterprise." Similarly, in Sohol v. Clark,75 personal property used
in an Indian resort operated on the reservation pursuant to a federal
program designed to further economic independence of Indians was
held exempt from personal property taxation. The underpinnings of
these decisions are weak to the extent that they rely on the now dis-
carded federal instrumentality doctrine, but when based on furthering
a federal purpose expressed in congressional legislation, they are con-
sistent with the Court's new preemption approach.76 Without Con-
gressional permission, state taxes on personal property used in Indian
activities on the reservation are probably invalid after McClanahan.
E. Other Taxes
In Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission,77
the Court struck down a state privilege tax on the gross receipts of a
non-Indian company conducting retail trading business with Indians
on the reservation on the basis of immunity implied from the Indian
Traders Act.78 The Court in McClanahan refused to restrict the
Warren holding to the theory that the federal government had
preempted the field only to the extent covered by the Indian Traders
Act (which does not purport to regulate Indian businesses selling to
non-Indians on the reservation). Instead, the Court cited Warren
Trading Post Co. for the broader proposition that the tax had been
invalidated because ". . . the Federal Government had been permit-
ting Indians largely to govern themselves, free from state interfer-
75. 78Wn.2d813.479P.2d925(1971).
76. Both the tribes involved in these cases have submitted to state jurisdiction pur-
suant to P.L. 83-280 and WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.021 (Supp. 1972), so the taxability
of Indian activity on their reservations depends, to a large degree, on whether this
federal and state legislation is determined to authorize state taxation. See text accom-
panying notes 84-100 infra.
77. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
78. Under the Indian commerce power, Congress enacted the Indian Trade and
Intercourse Act 25 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (1970). The last modification was legislated in
1908, and there have been no essential changes since the original law. Its primary
purpose was the regulation of enterprises operated by non-Indians selling to Indians
in order to protect Indians from unscrupulous merchants.
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ence.' '79 This interpretation of Warren clearly implies that Congress
has taken Indian trading so fully in hand that no state taxes can be
imposed on Indian businesses on reservations.80
In Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside,81
a state possessory interest tax on non-Indian lessees of Indian reser-
vation land was upheld on the theory that the tax was assessed only
against the lessee's interest in the land and not on the land itself, even
though its rental value was admittedly decreased by the tax. The
Court relied on a federal instrumentality case82 upholding taxation of
a lessee's interest in tax-exempt land owned by the United States and
on the proposition that tax exemptions are never implied. Though the
application of the federal instrumentality doctrine to Indians was re-
jected in Mescalero and the rule against implying tax exemptions was
relaxed with respect to taxation on the reservation in McClanahan,
this case probably remains good law as long as the distinction between
use of property by non-Indians and the property itself continues to be
recognized.8 3
III. P.L. 83-280 AND TONASKET
In the discussion of the Oklahoma Tax Commission,8 4 Organized
Village of Kake v. Egan 5 and Mason86 cases, the Court noted that
the tribes involved did not possess the usual accouterments of sover-
eignty, a fact which distinguished these cases permitting state taxation
from those where state taxation of Indian activity on reservations was
79. 411 U.S. at 170.
80. But see discussion of imposing a use tax on the non-Indian party in text
accompanying notes 66-68 supra. If the state can impose compensating use tax on
reservation sales of cigarettes to non-Indians, it will virtually have destroyed a
thriving Indian enterprise. Such an effect seems to interfere with the exclusive federal
control over Indian trading established in Warren. On the other hand, the use tax
also interferes with a thriving interstate commerce between adjoining states with dif-
fering rates of sales tax. Attempts to brand the use tax as "protective tariff" were
rejected in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 586 (1937).
81. 442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 197 1), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972). The reservation
involved in this case was subject to state jurisdiction assumed pursuant
to P.L. 83-280, but the Court did not consider this factor in rendering
its decision.
82. United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
83. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
84. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
85. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
86. See text accompanying notes 30-34 and notes 56-60 supra.
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impermissible. The Tonasket case, which the Court remanded for
reconsideration in light of its new Constitutional approach, 87 involves
a Colville Indian whose tribe has ceded jurisdiction to the State of
Washington pursuant to P.L. 83-280.88 Whether this cession puts the
Colvilles89 in the same category as the Alaska Indians and the Osages
with respect to state taxation is the subject of the remainder of this
note.
As originally drafted, P.L. 83-280 specifically permitted a number
of named states to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over tribes
87. The remand order also refers to new cigarette tax legislation, WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 82.24.250-.260 (Supp. 1972), which arguably would moot the case.
88. The pertinent portions of P.L. 83-280 (see note 9 supra) are:
Section 2 (civil jurisdiction):
(a) Each of the States listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over
offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed
opposite the name of the State to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction
over offenses committed elsewhere within the State, and the criminal laws ofstach
State shall have the san force and effect within s/ch Indian country as they have
elsewhere within the State. (emphasis added)
(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxa-
tion of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any In-
dian any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United
States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States:
or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent
with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pur-
suant thereto; or shall deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or commu-
nity of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty. or immu-
nity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to hunting.
trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof. (savings clause)
Section 4 (criminal jurisdiction)
(a) Each of the States listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over
civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise
in the areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State to the same
extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those
civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons or pri-
vate property shall have the sane force and effect within such Indian country as
they have elsewhere within the State. (emphasis added)
(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxa-
tion of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any
Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United
States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States;
or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent
with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pur-
suant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate
proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or
any interest therein. (savings clause)
(c) Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter adopted by an In-
dian tribe, band, or community in the exercise of any authority which it may pos-
sess shall, if not inconsistent withi any applicable civil law of the State, be given
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within their borders. It further provided authority for other states to
assume such jurisdiction without the permission of the affected tribes.
Subsequently, the act was amended to require tribal consent for such
state assumption of jurisdiction.9 0 In McClanahan, the Court inferred
that Congress had deemed it necessary to give federal consent by P.L.
83-280 to states which wished to acquire jurisdiction over reseryation
Indians. Without such consent, these states could obtain no jurisdic-
tion over Indian reservations except to the extent permitted by the
Williams rule,9 1 which the McClanahan Court clearly limited to
non-Indian activities on the reservation.
The legislative history of P.L. 83-280 is confusing with regard to
the act's purpose. It was passed in response to the law and order
hiatus on reservations, but was stated to have much more sweeping
aims: withdrawal of federal administration of Indian affairs wherever
practicable and termination of the application of federal Indian legis-
lation in favor of administration of general state law.92 The purpose of
P.L. 83-280 may have been to withdraw general federal responsibility
for Indian affairs by terminating application of the federal instrumen-
tality and federal preemption doctrines to them. It implied an intent
that reservation activities no longer be exempt from state taxation.
Under this interpretation, only specific federal legislation, to the ex-
tent it conflicted with any state law, would take precedence on reser-
vations which had ceded civil and crimial jurisdiction to states pur-
suant to P.L. 83-280.
The scope of P.L. 83-280 is equally puzzling. That some appli-
cation of state tax laws was contemplated by Congress as a result
of its passage may be inferred from the savings clause,93 which
reaffirms the tax-exempt status of some Indian property. If no
jurisdiction to tax was intended, why did Congress think a savings
clause was necessary? An argument might be made that the savings
clause in P.L. 83-280 protects Indians from any taxation which could
result in a lien upon trust property, thus deriving total Indian tax
immunity from the tax-exempt status of Indian land.
A narrow interpretation plausibly can be given to P.L. 83-280,
90. 25 U.S.C.§ 1321 (1968) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. 3, 83 Stat.
79(1968)).
91. See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
92. Senate Report No. 699, 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2409.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1360 (1968).
209
Washington Law Review Vol. 49: 191, 1973
reading it as an attempt to meet the specific goal of providing state
rather than federal enforcement of "law and order." Congress did not
intend, it might be argued, to subject reservations to the whole range
of state regulatory and tax laws; it merely proposed to give the state
jurisdiction to adjudicate civil disputes and prosecute criminal activity
occurring on reservations. 94 Tax and regulatory laws are frequently
enforced by criminal sanctions9 5 however, and P.L. 83-280 seems to
give state criminal laws a sweeping application to reservations 96 which
arguably implies an intent to enforce the tax laws and prima facie, an
intent to tax. On the other hand, if P.L. 83-280 is such a broad grant
of jurisdiction, then it may amount to an unconstitutional delegation
of federal legislative authority over Indian commerce. 97
Until Tonasket, the Supreme Court had never had a case con-
cerning a P.L. 83-280 reservation before it, except to consider the
procedures by which tribal consent was obtained.98 However, the
Court has referred to the act in several cases, primarily as an indica-
tion of congressional Indian policy. 99 Similarly, no lower courts have
discussed the perplexing problems of interpreting P.L. 83-280, other
94. Legislative history is inconclusive. The report of the Senate Comittee on Insular
Affairs refers to the proposed bill as conferring state jurisdiction "with respect to crim-
inal offenses and civil causes of action committed or arising on Indian reservations
within Such States, and for other purposes .... " Senate Report No. 699. 1953 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2409. The House committee report noted:
[ . . t] he Indians of several states have reached a stage of acculturation and
development that makes desirable extension of State jurisdiction . . . . Permit-
ting the State courts to adjudicate civil controversies arising on Indian reserva-
tions, and to extend to those reservations the substantive Civil laws of the re-
spective states insofar as those laws are of general application to private persons
or private property, is deemed desirable.
House Report No. 848. 1953 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2412. However this wording
might be interpreted, the emphasis at the time of the Act's passage seemed to be on the
regulation of private rights among individuals and property. For a strong argument in
support of this interpretation see Israel & Smithson, Indian Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty
and Economic Development, 49 N.D.L. REV. 267, 290-97 (1973).
95. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 82.24.110 (1963) (cigarette tax violations are gross-
misdemeanors). See also Ricon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego.
324 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.Cal. 1971) (the criminal sanctions of the San Diego gambling ordi-
nance were applied on the basis of California's P.L. 83-280 jurisdiction to nul-
lify a gambling ordinance enacted by the governing body of the Ricon Indian
reservation).
96. P.L. 83-280 § 2(a).
97. Compare In re Rahrer. 140 U.S. 545 (1891) with Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
98. Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
99. E.g., Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n. 380 U.S. 685
n.3 (1965).
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than to consider the methods of assuming state jurisdiction under it.100
The ultimate decision in the Tonasket case will undoubtedly settle
many of the issues concerning the interpretation of P.L. 83-280 and
shed additional light on the future consequences flowing from the
Court's new constitutional direction.
IV. CONCLUSION
Though the Court embarked on a new Constitutional direction in
the McClanahan and Mescalero cases by asserting its theory of federal
preemption against a backdrop of Indian sovereignty, the Court pre-
served all its prior decisions by allowing state jurisdiction over
non-Indians on reservations to an extent not inconsistent with tribal
self-government and by excepting reservations which do not have the
usual attributes of sovereignty from the operation of the new doctrine.
After these decisions, it is clear that state income taxes cannot be im-
posed on Indians working on the reservation. The status of state in-
heritance taxes and state use taxes as applied to non-Indian customers
of reservation Indian businessmen has not been settled. Furthermore,
the Court's emphasis on construing the particular legislation involved
in each case-in assessing congressional intent either to exempt In-
dian activity off the reservation from state taxation or to permit state
taxation of Indian activity on the reservation-makes prediction of
the result in individual cases difficult. For many Indians, the answer
to these questions depends upon whether the cession of civil and crim-
inal jurisdiction to state authorities under P.L. 83-280 includes the
power to tax.
The policy underlying the Court's new theory appears to be
midway between the poles of assimilation and sovereignty, leaving the
pendulum of federal Indian policy suspended in mid-air. On one
hand, Indians are protected from state encroachment on reservations
by federal preemption. On the other hand, federal preemption pro-
100. E.g., Quinalt v. Gallagher, 388 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 907. The Court in Quinalt held that whether "the people" have appropriately
amended their state constitution to assume P.L. 83-280 jurisdiction was a state question
Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971) may cast some doubt on
the Quinalt ruling since the Court emphasized strict compliance with P.L. 83-280 would
be required in assuming jurisdiction. Kennerly may be distinguished on the ground that
tribal consent, not the consent of the state's people was at issue.
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vides no constitutional protection to Indian sovereignty from the will of
Congress itself.
Clydia J. Cuykendall
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